Is the Army in Ideological Resistance?

Somebody refused to execute a legitimate order from the President of the country. And it is someone in the South African National Defense Force. This is dangerous. It is about a standoff between soft, civilian, versus hard, military power. This is the stuff a coup d’état is made of. It is the first tentative manifestations of military take-over. No country build on civilian government must ever allows the armed forces, and then specifically the Army, to ever be put in a position where the military power can compete with the civilian power structures for control. There can only be one winner.

In Western democracies, the armed forces are commanded under strict civilian control. The head of state is regarded as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and the head of government as the de facto representative of the civilian regime, exercising demand over the army, navy and Airforce. In China, the Army is an integral branch of the Communist Party, with the executive of the party exercising unquestionable command over its actions. In Russia, the dictator-President (or formerly the Tzar) is in charge of the armed forced. Nobody disputes it.

In all of these examples, the golden thread that ensure civilian command over the armed forces, is a combination of Constitutional provision, and, but especially, a code of ethics (an ‘embedded culture”) that ensure that armed forces do not turn the brutal hard force (weapons) they have to their disposal on civilian authorities in order to gain access over state power.

Thing is that this established understanding must be unquestionable. That is not always the case. In South America, during the previous century, all of the following countries had, at some point, been governed by military juntas that gained state power through violent coups: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia.

In Africa this occurrence has been pandemic in nature. In recent times alone there has been a string of military take-overs of government, notably in West Africa's "coup belt" (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea, Chad, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau), challenging democratic governance amidst political instability, security crises, and governance failures, often fuelled by security concerns like terrorism and discontent with civilian rule, leading to postponed elections and withdrawals from international bodies like the ICC. 

Thing is that most of these coups have been hailed in Africa, and South Africa, as justified to get rid of exploitive imperialist powers. (The excuses for most coupes are “to bring about stability”, “stolen elections”, and “to protect the people”). Fact of the matter is that this message definitely resonates with the sentiments and convictions of many very powerful people in the country’s political and military regimes.

I don’t think a coup d’état is imminent in South Africa (but I may be wrong, who knows). However, something is cooking, boiling just below the surface. Thing is, realistically speaking, what counter force is there in South African to prevent the take-over of government by the military? The Police is in a total mess; even if they want to, I very much doubt whether they will have the capacity to successful counter a coup attempt. And I do not think that they necessarily would to even like to try. As proven over-and-over again, specifically with the wide-spread unrest in the country, focusing on  KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021, the country’s intelligence services are, for all practical purposes, non-existing.  The part that is partly operational, will probably sympathise with potential plotters to grab power through military means.

Let’s face it, more than 30 years of very poor governance, corruption and the undermining, the hollowing out of state institutions, have created a void, a virtual collapse in the structure and functioning of the South African state. This includes a dramatic collapse in coherence and discipline in the lines of authority and oversight of the state.

The South African military has approximately 530 generals, and 71,000-72,000 troops; that is a ratio of 1:180, or one general for 180-184 soldiers. That is ridiculous. In the United States, the ratio is one general for every 1,400 troops. In NATO, this ratio widen considerably, even to the level of one general for every 5,000 troops. The point is that the South African armed forces is clearly organised in a manner that is dysfunctional and primarily aimed at retaining a patronage network. It is ineffective, yes, but it still has guns, even armoured vehicles and tanks, regardless of out outdated and poorly maintained it may be. No other actor in civic life in the country have a competing armoured capacity.

However, I think, the main problem in South Africa is ideology. General Rudzani Maphwanya, the chief of the Defence Force, has openly expressed support for the brutal regime of Iran, in spite of the fact that the United States and most of the Western world regards it as a state sponsoring terrorism in the Middle East. The general apparently expressed sentiments to the effect that South Africa is a partner of Iran in its fight against imperialist empires, noticeably the United States.

Now the Chief of the South African Navy, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese, is under scrutiny. Someone has blatantly disobeyed a legitimate order form the President of the country to exclude Iran from last week’s military exercises in South African territorial waters. And again, Iran was involved.

It is also an open secret that the top brass of the South African Defence Force has more than just a little sympathy with Russia in its war against the Ukraine.  The reason why I mention this, is because its shows ideological sympathy; in this instance with former allies from the time of the Cold War, the time of the freedom struggle.

So, who ignored a direct order from the President?

It may be the Minister of Defense, Angie Motshekga. However, I doubt it. Motshekga’s problem is that she is too weak for the generals, but I don’t think she will openly defy a direct order from Ramaphosa. 

To be honest, it may just have been utter inefficiency as well, given the state of the SANDF. Somewhere someone may just never transfer to the message to those supposed to receive it.

Nevertheless, the pint remains that most of the current top command structure of the South African National Defence Force was integrated from the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress, following the 1994 political settlement in the country. This include Maphwanya and Lobese. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was not a national army; it was the military wing of a political party (or then, at the time of the liberation struggle, of a liberation movement, the ANC). Most of the members of the SANDF would eventually be recruited from the ranks of former liberation armies. The dogmas are different. Very importantly, the entrenched cultural of obedience to civilian oversight are lacking.

Personally, I don’t think it is simply a matter of Ramaphosa being too soft, too accommodating, that resulted in the revolt we are seeing from military commanders. I think it much more. I think, given the situation in the ANC, and the deteriorating political and governance situation in South Africa, that Ramaphosa does not actually has the required capacity, the means, to act decisively against the generals. I am of the opinion that that there a high likelihood that the majority of members of the ANC’s NEC may just vote Ramaphosa down, should be submit the issues to it. That is what they did on their response to Trump’s removal of Venezuelan President Maduro. At the end of the day, the ANC, and even the government, issued strongly worded statements condemning the actions of the United States.

During my time as a management consultant working in South African municipalities, I have noted a very interesting phenomenon in the political regime of South Africa post-1994. I have labelled it “blurred lines of authority and accountability.” Mayors of municipalities often have less functional authority than senior managers in the municipal administration. The reason for this is simple: Senior administrators earned higher salaries and benefits than the mayor. But the senior administrators are more influential in the ANC than the mayor. Practically, the mayors therefore report to the administrators.

Many people in South Africa regards the political settlement reached in the country as “unfinished business.” They were denied the awareness of victory over the enemy (which is the former South African Defence Force and the Apartheid regime). From a military perspective, they were denied the victory parades through the streets of Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town. The political agreements of 1994 translated into an ideology of “a revolution paused.” They still pursue the revolution, and the ultimate victory. Initially the relative peaceful transition in the country stalled the “completion of the revolution.”

As the SANDF, and even the SAPS, gradually deteriorated, also in its fighting capacity and the state of his weaponary and systems, the sense of anger and a type of “humiliation” increased among senior commanders. South Africa was not any longer the dominant military force in Africa south of the Sahara it once has been. This has led to loss of esteem; among military peers on the Continent, but also in terms of global power competitiveness.

The ideology with which the commanders of the SANDF associate, is not that of Ramaphosa and his faction of the ANC; in fact, he is seen as a “traitor to the cause.” They associate with the much more fundamentalist ideology of “total” victory; meaning, in practical terms, returning to the times of the freedom struggle, totally align South Africa with the likes of Russia, China and Iran and defeating the forces of Imperialism (including what is regarded as the resemblances of Apartheid).

The question must be asked: What is the level, or extend, of support for Jacob Zuma among the top commanders of the SANDF? Not only was Zuma intimately involved, during the years of the freedom struggle, with military intelligence on behalf of the ANC, but he was probably a comrade of many of these generals. Furthermore, it sure seems, at first glance, that his more fundamentalist political agenda closely resembles their own utterances.

I don’t think that South Africa is on the verge of a coup d’état, but I do think that there is open revolt against civilian oversight in the military forces of the country. I also think the drivers of this revolt are ideology and the sense of a lost victory.

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