The Discrimination Settlement

For me, in South Africa, the rules of the game, for determine citizen freedoms and rights, lay in the Constitution negotiated in the early 1990’s during the Codesa process.

That is how I must interpret my rights and obligations as a citizen of South Africa; based on the stipulations of the Constitution, and not on that of the Freedom Charter, or of the socialist and racist ideals and ideologies of the vaguely defined National Democratic Revolution.

In fact, the only interest I have in the Freedom Charter, is as a theoretical, Socialist document worshipped by an ANC constantly longing back to the glorious old days of the struggle – but with retaining the loot gathered through tenderpreneurship, cadre deployment, nepotism and state capture since 1994.

Fact of the matter is that the Freedom Charter and National Democratic Revolution should have no real impact on my life, or my rights and duties towards the state. But it has, because the ANC has broken the 1994 negotiated agreement. They do not respect the rules of the game agreed upon.

I agreed to that agreement under the clear assumption that that will be the rules going forward; now the ANC suddenly declares that it was only a phase towards a larger goal. So, I was lied to, and the terms of an agreement that I was party to, is now broken.

Let’s understand the context of this agreement in the 1990’s.

Firstly, the Apartheid government was under enormous pressure. It was fighting a relatively high intensity war in Angola, and on the South West African border, for which they found it increasingly difficult to secure the weapons necessary to maintain the war effort.

But the former South African Defense Force has also proven that, in spite of these realities, and with its allies in the region, it was able to successfully fight against the South West African People's Organisation, the ANC’s MK, the Angolese army and the Cuban intervention groups.

Furthermore, it had a modern, world-class local weapon manufacturing industry, and in its possession were 5 to 6 atomic bombs.

It is possible that the tactical situation of the South African forces, on the ground, steadily became precarious, and that it was a contributing factor to convince the Apartheid government to start negotiating with the ANC and Nelson Mandela. However, there was not even a remote possibility that the combined forces of the Resistance could plausibly, through one mighty campaign, destroy the South African forces, push it to in-land, and capture Namibia and South Africa through military intervention.

Secondly, the internal resistance in South Africa against the Apartheid system was immense, and growing. Whole neighbourhoods were, for extended periods of time, engaged in daily, but especially nightly, raids and extreme violence. There was no doubt that people were extremely angry, and that large parts of the country were burning.

The trade unions, at the time very organised, and part of the great Mass Democratic Movement, were able to organise enormous boycotts and strikes, virtually overnight, which had a severe destructive impact on the South African economy. The Worf Council of Churches condemned the Apartheid government, and inside the country, extremely influential and untouchable church leaders, such as Desmond Tutu and Alan Boesak, played an important role to undermine the legitimacy of the South African government.

However, the violence was not yet a stage where it has flowed over into White neighbourhoods. Cross-border raids by elements of uMkhonto weSizwe were irritants, rather than really effective guerrilla excursions. South Africa had an extremely effective and efficient state intelligence agency; at the time, close to the level of Mossad. It also had highly trained and highly organised anti-riot police forces. The pressure, in this regard, was high, but not at a breaking point yet.

The resistance of churches was important, but more because of the moral influence it had on anti-Apartheid pressure groups worldwide, and not really on its internal dynamics. South African Whites had their own, historic and well organised churches and faith communities to take care of the “on-the-ground” need for spiritual comfort.

However, the resistance from faith leaders on the international stage, and specifically as a weapon of propaganda in the Western media, is undeniable; which, in turn, sway the opinion of populations, and therefore of governments and big business.

Thirdly, perhaps the single most important reason which forced the Apartheid government to the negotiation table, was the international economic sanctions against the country. The impact of these sanctions was reasonable bearable, as long as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Taiwan and parts of Western Europe did not really wholeheartedly commit to it, and did not fully apply it. But, in 1984, after PW Botha’s so-called Rubicon speech, the South African defaulting on its sovereign debt obligations, because of major economic institutions holding that debt refusing to roll it over, and calling it in, the economic ring of sanctions around South African closed in, and the impact really hurt the country’s economy badly.

The economic sanctions were worsened by the cultural boycott. South Africa was virtually totally cut off the broader internal cultural world, including movie realises and, most importantly, sport. For Afrikaners, the loss of international Rugby tests was especially tangible punishment.

But they could, and it, although an irritant survives without meaningful cultural and sporting engagement with the global community.

The point is this: Yes, the resistance to Apartheid was immense; yes, the pressure on the South African government to reform the Apartheid system and conform with the post-Second World norms of Human Rights and self-determination were extensive and all- encompassing.

But the Apartheid regime was not defeated; and the ANC was not in a position to just take over and make their own rules. In fact, there was kind of a stalemate of power; or, in the language the ANC will understand: The balance between opposing forces was more or less equal. Importantly, South Africa’s vital Western allies, including the United States and the UK, actively encourage the leaders of the Apartheid state to reach a settlement with the ANC. South Africa has become somewhat of a moral degenerate; a problem to conservative Western powers. But the country's Constitutional system, nor its military, and neither its economy, were defeated anywhere close to the point of unconditional surrender. There was still an opportunity to negotiate a system that will allow for a non-destructive and non-discriminating alternative.

Up to this point, all was equal, at a stalemate.

But then the process of negotiation started; starting with negotiations about negotiations.

Group rights; that was De Klerk's promise to White voters. You will retain your cultural and civil rights. We will make peace, and everyone will be equal and entitled to the same rights, privileges and protection under the law.

But the process of defeat started.  Initially Dr. Gerrit Viljoen played an important role. For him, the non-negotiable line in the sand was group rights, which must have protected Afrikaner rights. But he clashed with FW de Klerk and Roelf Meyer about this, and was retired in 1992.

After that, the White South Africans and Afrikaners were placed in the hands of the weak, inexperienced, leftist and glory-seeking Roelf Meyer. Meyer was out of the National Party less than a year after the 1994 general elections, and into the ANC not much later. What does that tell you about his commitment to the cause, or those he was supposed to represent? Of group rights, nothing substantial remained. Meyer became best buddies with Cyril Ramapahosa, the chief negotiator of the opposing force, while negotiations were still ongoing. Meyer became a comrade of ANC cadres, the enemies of Afrikaners, while supposedly negotiating on behalf of Afrikaners.

The longer the negotiations dragged on, the more the balance of force shifted towards the ANC. A settlement increasingly started looking turning into a surrender.

In one night, FW de Klerk fired almost the entire top command of the Défense Force; brilliant, highly experienced, proven officers, under the vague claim of a planned coup, which was never proven; with several of those generals later-on winning court cases about the matter.

But, by the time the choice was finally given to White voters to accept or reject the results of the negotiated settlement, in 1992, the writing has been on the wall. The ability to reject the negotiated settlement was eroded detrimentally.

The draft concept of a constitution made no real provision for groups rights, or much constitutional guarantees of the cultural rights of Afrikaners. Yet, De Klerk and Meyer persist with their lies, and promises about the protection of rights and privileges.

O, well, one thing can be said: De Kerlk, Roelf Meyer, Eloff, and several others did achieve their aims, which was international recognition and fame, and careers as consultants, with millions to be made, on the back of repeated broken promises to those they were suppose to represent.

The proof of defeat is written in the lines of the Constitution constantly referring to preferential treatment to previous disadvantaged individuals, in the clearly race-biased judgements of the country’s courts, its Public Protector and its so-called Human Rights Commission; in the text of the Black Economic Empowerment Act, of that of the Employment Equity act and in that of more than 140 pieces of other racist laws. It’s proven in the deliberate destruction of the Afrikaner's cultural assets, of unemployed White youth showed the door in the name of redress, in the withholding of educational opportunities to young people, because they happened to be born with a White skin, in the racist songs some groups are allowed to sing in public, while an old flag is banned as ‘hate speech”,  and transformation and in the stagnant careers of White South African, not promoted and retrenched purely because of their race.

Just to conclude: I am not opposed to the negotiations with the ANC, and other forces fighting for their freedom and restoration of human dignity in the pre-1994 part of the country’s history. They had a legitimate right to do so. In fact, there were real heroes created during this time in resistance; real heroes that deserve to be called “heroes”. It was shameful, the way non-White South Africans were stripped of all their rights in the country of their birth (and origin).

I was always of the view that those who were supposed to negotiate on behalf of me and mine did a pathetic job, and continuously made promises, none of which they have kept. I despite that reality (and them, for that). There was an opportunity, a tiny window of time and moment, to actually negotiate a settlement that could have produced an “everlasting” solution; negotiated between two adversaries in more or less equal balance of capacity. It did not happen; the one side walked away with the spoils, and the other with the knowledge that they are basically powerlessly surrendered to the will of the enemy.

My problem is that the Constitution actually allows for very, very little protection of my group and cultural rights; and, where it does, in terms of the initial intention of the writers, the Constitutional Court (and other courts in the country) almost always interpret it from a “transformational” angle (or [perspective; that is, an Apartheid legacy meaning is attached to the issue, and the “rights” of those, stereotypically so, regarded as associated with the Apartheid history are rejected).

And, the main unspoken issue: The essence of discrimination in SA is that the roots of the Constitution, and its interpretation, are increasingly not been traced back, or derived from, the balance in opposing worldviews reached during the Codesa negotiated settlement, but in the ideological roots of one side of the historic conflict; that is, to the Freedom Charter, and the National Democratic Revolution. The Constitution is, practically and judicially, read as extensions of revolutionary theory. The NDR is ideological, and an essential element of this ideology is race.

Discrimination in SA is that the roots of the Constitution, and its interpretation, are increasingly not been traced back, or derived from, the balance in opposing worldviews reached during the Codesa negotiated settlement, but in the ideological roots of one side of the historic conflict; that is, to the Freedom Charter, and the National Democratic Revolution. The Constitution is, practically and judicially, read as extensions of revolutionary theory. The NDR is ideological, and an essential element of this ideology is race.

Codes

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Image source: Flickr (Creative Commons)